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A CLASS OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS






A class of social choice mechanisms is described. Each mechanism
in the class, when viewed as a noncooperative game, is shown to possess
at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Some members of the clas^
are useful in social choice applications.
1. Description
Imagine a society consisting of n agents (1*1, n) who are to
choose among m social states (j"l, ...» m); n is at least 2, m is at least 3.
Each agent i is assumed to have a complete, reflexive, and transitive
ordering R(i) of the social states. Let r^^ represent the number of social ^
states which agent 1 strictly prefers to social state j; then
(1) j
R(i))
P(i)t y Iff r. J<
U(i))
There is an Initial endown^nt of rights, w(i), an integer-valued function
satisfying
(2) w(i) i 0 for all i
S w(l) * m - 1,
i
An agent has the right to object to Individual social states. Write x » 1
ij
if agent i objects to social state j, • 0 otherwise. Every player makes
the maximuiQ number of objections.
(3) r X » w(l) for all 1.
J
X.. " 0 or 1 for all 1 and j.
Ij
A social state j is not chosen if some player objects to it; thus, social
state j is chosen if and only if
(4) ^ *4 4 " ^ Clearly, at least one social state is chosen.
i ^
Thus, the social choice mechanism finds for the society [(i), (j), (R(i)),
w(i)] a social choice based on the revealed objections
2. Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
When one of the above mechanisms is viewed as a noncooperative game in
normal form, each player i has for a strategy space the set of vectors *
(x^,, X. ) satisfying (3). In this context we prove the following:
11 im
Theorem: All mechanisms satisfying (2) - (4) possess at least one pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let I « j i: w(i) >0), relabeled if necessary so that I « j 1, k'
where k ^ n.
Let lei maximize £ r, .x_ ,
j
S.T.
X- « 0 or 1.
It is clear that a solution exists; call it
Now 2 e I maximizes ^ r^^x^^
S.T. £ x^j =w(2)
x^j = 0 or 1
and S x^^ x*^ - 0, at x*.
The naxlmlzation sequence continues xintll k e I maximizes
at X*.
S.T. S X, . ® w(k)
0 or 1.
k-1
and 2 x^. ( n X* ) « 0
j 1=1
The claim then Is that x* = (xj, x*) is a Nash equilibrium.
By the construction there exists an unique social state h such that
Sx*^ = 0, which social choice corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. Suppose
there exists lei and social state h' such that < r^^ and = 1;
that is, 1 has objected to h* which he happens to prefer to the social
choice h» Such must surely happen if x* is not a Nash equilibrium. Now the





contradicting the definition of x*. Since i was chosen arbitrarily, x* is
Indeed the desired Nash equilibrium.
Social state j is a weak Pareto optimum if there is no social state j'
such that for all individuals 1, jP(l)j'.
Corollary; If x* solves the above maximization sequence and j is the chosen
social state, then J is a weak Fareto optimum.
Proof: If for all i, J*P(i)j, then the player who objected to j* does better
by objecting to j instead, contradicting that x* is a Nash equilibrium.
This assertation cannot be strengthened to strong Pareto optimum, as
the following example shows.
Example 1: n - 2, m = 3, w(i) = 1 for both i. Preferences are 1P(1)2P(1)3,
3P(2)1I(2)2. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, ((0,0,1), (0,1,0))
and ((0,0,1), (1,0,0)). The social state corresponding to the latter, social
state 2, is not a strong Pareto optimum.
In the case where the preferences of all agents are strict orders, the
social state corresponding to the constructed Nash equilibrium will however
be a strong Pareto optimum.
Since the labeling of the members of I in the proof is arbitrary,'there
are in principle at most kj Nash equilibria so constructible. However, not
all the Nash equilibria are solutions of such a maximization sequence. Witness
the following example.
Example 2; Like example 1, only now preferences are 1I(1)2P(1)3,
1I(2)2P(2)3. Then ((0,0,1), (0,0,1)) is a Nash equilibrium, although not
constructible by the method of the theorem.
For the situation of this example to obtain, all agents must be indifferent
among the set of social states not objected to.
The equilibrium set consists of all social states j such that for each j
there exists a Nash equilibrium which leads to the^choice of j. By the above
discussion, any member of the equilibrium set is a weak Pareto optimum. The
idea of the equilibrium set is that it is not the strategic maneuverings so
much as the chosen social state, that is of Interest in social choice
theory.
3. Applications
The class of social choice mechanisms described above is useful for |y
applications In social choice theory. Three such applications are made
here: to Glbbard's theorem on straightforward game forms [1], to Sen's
Paradox of the Paretian liberal [5,6], and to Rawls* theory of Justice [4].
Agame form is a function from the product space of Individual strategies
to the space of social states. In a game form, individual utilities have not
yet been attached to outcomes (social states). A game form is straight
forward for player 1, if given R(i), he has a dominant strategy. A
player is a dictator for a game form, if, for every social state j, he has
a strategy, such that j is the social state chosen. Dictatorial mechanisms
of the present class require that w(k) = m - 1 for some 1. Gibbard has shown
that every straightforward game form with at least three possible outcomes
is dictatorial. Clearly, a straightforward game form possesses at least
one pure-strategy.Nash equilibrium, each player playing a dominant strategy.
The class of mechanisms satisfying (2) - (A) shows that straightforwardness
is not a necessary condition for possession of pure strategy Nash equilibria,
once utilities are attached to outcomes. Indeed, the situation may be
straightforward for no player. Take the case 1P(1)2P(1)3, 2P(2)1P(2)3, each
player having one objection. Both ((0,1,0), (0,0,1)) and ((0,0,1), (1,0,0))
are Nash equilibria, but neither player has a dominant strategy. Nor is it
at all clear in such a situation (as Gibbard himself points out [1, p. 589]
what counts as manipulation on the part of an Individual player. If what
one is after are Nash equilibria, it is possible to escape the "regrettable
consequences" of Gibbard's result on game forms.
Sen's Liberal Paradox [5, pp. 78-88] shows that on a certain view of
liberalism, liberal values conflict with the weak Pareto principle. This
result has spurred considerable research activity (the bibliography in [6]
contains over fifty items). An argtunent can be made for the following
expression of liberal principle: every individual has the right to object
to at least one social state. In order for this claim to be logically
consistent in the present framework, one requires the following strengthening
of (2):
(2)' w(k) > 0 for all i
rw(i) « m - 1 s n.
As seen above, the equilibrium set of such mechanisms does consist of Pareto
optima; as such, they invite comparison with the mechanisms suggested by
Gibbard [2, Thm. 4]. On the one hand, mechanisms satisfying (2)' dispense
with Gibbard's notion of waiving rights (for the difficulties of which see
n
[3]); on the other hand, they relax Gibbard's structural requirement that m s 2 .
Thus, mechanisms satisfying (2)* appear satisfactory on formal grounds. Again,
in the paradigm cases of "Lady Chatterly's Lover" [5], "Edwin vs. Angelina
[2], and "Work Choice" [6], mechanisms satisfying (2)' yield reasonable
outcomes on intuitive liberal grounds. If rights are something a person can
stand on against the rest of society, then mechanisms satisfying (2)' express
such rights.
As a final application, consider the following problem from the theory
of justice* Suppose a social state is a distribution of utility, which is
comparable and additive but not transferable. There are n + 1 social states,
the first n of which constitute the standard basis for Euclidean n-space.
«-
The last social state m is given by
m = (u-, ..., u )
1 n
0 < u^ < 1
= 1.
In negotiations before a veil of ignorence, each agent is allowed one objection.
All Nash equilibria correspond to social state m. Now if one interprets
the first n social states as expressing the various egoistic conceptions of
justice, it is clear that egoistic conceptions are unacceptable before a veil
of ignorance. Further, not even presenting egoistic conceptions in an
Original Position (for instance, in Rawls* theory of justice [4, p. 136])
is justified, since principles unacceptable before a veil of ignorance remain
unacceptable behind a veil of Ignorance.
REFERENCES
1. Gibbard, A. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result,"
Econometrica. 41 (1973), 587-601.
2. . "A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim," Journal of
Economic Theory. 7 (1974), 388-410.
3. Kelley, J. S, "Rights Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian
Claim," Journal of Economic Theory 13 (1976), 138-153.
4. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971.
5. Sen, A. K. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco:
Holdren-Day, 1970.
6. . "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights." Economlca 43 (1976),
217-245.
